Officer Cannot Stick Head in Car Window to take a Sniff. State v. Grant.


Brief Brief: State v. Grant, 449 Md. 1 (2016).

HOLDING:  The Maryland Court of Appeals had held that a police officer, who inserts his head into a passenger side window of a defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop, conducted a search under the Fourth Amendment, ( State v. Grant 449 Md. 1 (2016)). In Grant, the court found that the detection of odor of marihuana from the Officer sticking his head through the window, exceeded permissible scope of the stop. ( Id. )


Posted in - 4th Amendment, -- B.B.'s. Brief Briefs

Prosecutorial Misconduct in Plea Bargain Sentencing. Miller v. State


Brief Brief. Miller v. State, 276 Md. 249, 1974.

Issue:  After a plea bargain has been made, a Prosecutor subverted the spirit of the agreement by making damaging statements at the time of sentencing.

Quote One:   “Prosecutor’s promise to make no recommendation as to the sentence reasonably means a ‘commitment not to make any damning or even potentially damaging statement at the time of sentencing.’”  Id. at 253 quoting  Commonwealth v. Alvarado,  442 Pa. 516, 529 (1971)).

Quote Two:  “In the instant case, the defendant’s guilty plea rested in part on the prosecution’s promise to make ‘no recommendation’ as to ‘sentencing’ or as to ‘disposition.’ The probation officer thereafter recommended that the defendant be placed on probation on the condition that he undergo therapy at a mental institution. The prosecuting attorney then stated that he was ‘not in full compliance with the recommendation of the Probation Officer.’ When the prosecuting attorney said this, he was advising or suggesting to the judge that the conditional probation recommendation not be completely accepted. This constituted a ‘recommendation’ by the prosecuting attorney as to the ‘disposition’ of the case. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney certainly appeared to be recommending that imprisonment instead of conditional probation be imposed. Absent some further explanation by the prosecuting attorney, the only logical inference that could be drawn from his statement is that he was urging imprisonment rather than probation. The prosecutor’s statement was inconsistent with his undertaking to make ‘no recommendation.’…[citations omitted]… As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Commonwealth v. Alvarado, [442 Pa. 516, 529 (1971)] a prosecutor’s promise to make no recommendation as to the sentence reasonably means a ‘commitment not to make any damning or even potentially damaging statements at the time of sentencing.’” Id. at 253.

Quote Three: “Accordingly, where a guilty plea has been induced by the prosecutor’s agreement to make no recommendation as to sentencing, and the prosecutor violates that agreement, the defendant may at his option have the guilty plea vacated. On the other hand, if the defendant so desires, he may elect to leave the plea standing and be resentenced. As the Supreme Court stated in Santobello v. New York,  [404 U.S. 257, 263, (1971)] the resentencing should be by a different judge.” Id.

Posted in - Criminal Law, - Ethics, - Plea Agreements, -- B.B.'s. Brief Briefs

Petition to Return Seized Animal

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Petition Pursuant to Criminal Law Section 10-615: Return of Animals

Below is a redacted section from a motion to return animals when they are seized pursuant to a criminal charge.  It was drafted by Paul J. Notarianni in 2015.

NOW COMES:  The above captioned Defendant, by and through counsel, to move to have animals return to the Defendant, pursuant to Maryland Criminal Law Section 10-615 (d)(2) and offers in support:

ONE:  That the Defendant is charged in the captioned matters with violation of Criminal Law Section 10-604 (a)(5).

TWO:  That two dogs, known as Blank and Blank II, were seized by the State on or about (DATE), and that those animals remain in the custody of  the county government of (blank) County.

THREE:  That it is the Defendant’s assertion that she was never advised of her administrative options regarding the seizure of her dogs, as required by Criminal Law Section 10-615 (d).

FOUR:  Maryland Law permits for an owner of animals that have been seized in an animal cruelty case to file a petition in the District Court within ten days after their removal.  (See Criminal Law Section 10-615 (d)(2)).  

FIVE:  It is the Defendant’s assertion that her living condition is stable and it is appropriate to have the animals returned to her, or, in the alternative, to have the animals given to the custody of family or other third party friend of the Defendant, in lieu of their continued confinement at an animal shelter.  

WHEREFORE:  The Defendant requests that this Honorable Court pass an order to have the dogs known as Blank and Blank II returned to the custody of the Defendant, or in the alternative, to have Blank and Blank II placed into the custody of a family member or third party acquaintance of the Defendant.

Posted in - Criminal Law, - Notes and Forms, - Pretrial

Suppress Identification

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The following was taken from a motion to suppress identification.  The original was drafted by Paul J. Notarianni in 2015.

The Defendant offers the following argument as to suppression of the identification.   A Defendant in a criminal matter is protected by due process against the introduction of evidence of, or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures. (U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14; Jones v. State,395 Md. 97, 107 (2006)).    The Supreme Court has recognized that improper use of  photographs by police may cause misidentifications.  (Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. at 383-84).  There is a two part test for inquiry of due process violations related to extra-judicial identifications.  (Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 577 (1987); Jones v. State 395 Md. 97, 109 (2006)).  The first is whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. (Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 577, 530 A.2d 743 (1987)).  If the answer is “no,” the inquiry ends and both the extra-judicial identification and the in-court identification are admissible at trial. If, on the other hand, the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the second step is triggered, and the court must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. (Upshire v. State, 208 Md.App. 383 402 2012)). The Court of Special Appeals has recognized that an officer providing a single picture to a witness for identification purposes is impermissibly suggestive. (Id.)  “When the identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, it is the prosecution’s burden to show  ‘that the in-court identification offered had a source independent of the illegal pre-trial confrontation or viewing. It must do this by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is based upon observations of the suspect by the witness other than the confrontation or photographic identifications.’ ” (Id. quoting Smith and Samuels v. State, 6 Md.App. 59, 68, 250 A.2d 285 (1969)). “This [C]ourt has emphasized: ‘It is only where there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, to wit, a situation where the identification could not be found to be reliable, that exclusion would be warranted. Short of that point, the evidence is for the jury to weigh.’ ” (Id.  quoting Turner v. State, 184 Md.App. 175, 184, 964 A.2d 695 (2009)).

Posted in - Criminal Law, - Pretrial | Tagged , , , ,

Frisking Car Passengers. Norman v. State


Brief Brief.  Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373 (2017).

Issue:  Court of Appeals held that a police officer lacked reasonable articulate suspicion to search a car passenger, despite a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the car.


Quote 1:
“Recently, in Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94, 99, 152 A.3d 661 (2017), this Court addressed whether, in light of the decriminalization of possession of less than ten grams of marijuana, a law enforcement officer has probable cause to search a vehicle based on an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. This Court unanimously held that:
a law enforcement officer has probable cause to search a vehicle where the law enforcement officer detects an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, as marijuana in any amount remains contraband, notwithstanding the decriminalization of possession of less than ten grams of marijuana; and the odor of marijuana gives rise to probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.
Id. This case requires us to decide a different issue involving the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle—namely, whether a law enforcement officer who detects an odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle with multiple occupants has reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are armed and dangerous, and thus may frisk—i.e., pat down—the vehicle’s occupants for weapons.” (Id. at 378).
 Quote 2:
…”We reaffirm our holding in Robinson, 451 Md. at 98–99, 152 A.3d 661, that the odor of marijuana alone gives rise to probable cause to search a vehicle because the odor of marijuana indicates that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. We hold that, where an odor of marijuana emanates from a vehicle with multiple occupants, a law enforcement officer may frisk, i.e., pat down, an occupant of the vehicle if an additional circumstance or circumstances give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupant is armed and dangerous. Stated otherwise, for a law enforcement officer to have reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk one of multiple occupants of a vehicle from which an odor of marijuana is emanating, the totality of circumstances must indicate that the occupant in question is armed and dangerous. An odor of marijuana alone emanating from a vehicle with multiple occupants does not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are armed and dangerous and subject to frisk.” (Id. at 379).
 Quote 3:
…”For the Fourth Amendment’s purposes, a “seizure” of a person is any nonconsensual detention. See Barnes v. State, 437 Md. 375, 390, 86 A.3d 1246, 1255 (2014). There are two types of seizures of a person: (1) an arrest, whether formal or de facto, which must be supported by probable cause; and (2) a Terry stop, which must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. See Barnes, 437 Md. at 390, 86 A.3d at 1255. During a Terry stop, for the sake of the safety of the law enforcement officer and others, a law enforcement officer may frisk a person who the law enforcement officer has reason to believe is armed and dangerous. See Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 541–42, 144 A.3d 771, 780–81 (2016).
A law enforcement officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous where, under the totality of the circumstances, and based on reasonable inferences from particularized facts in light of the law enforcement officer’s experience, a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would have felt that he or she was in danger. See id. at 542, 144 A.3d at 781. Because a court considers the totality of the circumstances, the court must not parse out each individual circumstance; in other words, a court must not engage in a “divide and conquer” analysis. See id. at 543, 544, 144 A.3d at 781, 782. Indeed, a circumstance may be innocent by itself, but appear suspicious when considered in combination with other circumstances. See id. at 544, 144 A.3d at 782.
Reasonable articulable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical concept that depends on practical aspects of day-to-day life; as such, a court must give due deference to a law enforcement officer’s experience and specialized training, which enable the law enforcement officer to make inferences that might elude a civilian. See id. at 543, 144 A.3d at 781. That said, although reasonable articulable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause, it must be greater than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. See id. at 543, 144 A.3d at 781. And, a law enforcement officer may not frisk a defendant simply because the law enforcement officer initiated a lawful traffic stop. See id. at 545, 144 A.3d at 782.” (Id. at 386-387).
Posted in - 4th Amendment, -- B.B.'s. Brief Briefs

Other Crimes Evidence and Witnesses. Sessoms v. State.


Brief Brief. Sessoms v. State, 357 Md. 274 (2000).

Issue: The test for admitting other crimes evidence, under Maryland Rule 5-404,  does not apply to other crimes or wrongs committed by anyone other than defendant.


“We hold that the test for admitting other crimes evidence in criminal proceedings enunciated in Faulkner generally does not apply to crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by someone other than a criminal defendant. The other crimes evidence rule is a court-created standard designed to ensure that a defendant is tried for the crime for which he or she is on trial and to prevent a conviction based on reputation or propensity to commit crimes, rather than the facts of the case. Because this rule is premised upon protecting an accused from undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude other crimes evidence involving alleged actions by others testifying in the criminal proceedings. This is especially so when the evidence is crucial to the defense in a criminal proceeding and concerns impeachment of a witness with a possible prejudice, bias, interest, or motive to falsely testify.” (Id. at 294).

Posted in - Evidence, -- B.B.'s. Brief Briefs

Quick Reference of Impeachable Offenses

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Quick Reference of Impeachable Offenses

Note:  This list is not all inclusive.  The list incorporates selected items (indicated by “*”) from A Reference Chart of Impeachable and Non-Impeachable Offenses. (The Western Maryland Law Journal, Vol. 1. No. 1. 1998, page 66 (available:  The list incorporates selected items (indicated by “**”) from Bonsib, Robert & Coleman, Megan, A Quick Reference to the Use of Prior Convictions, Prince George’s County Bar Association News Journal, September 2014 (available:


CDS Related

CDS Manufacturing:* (See: Carter v. State, 80 Md. App. 686 (1989)).

Cocaine Distribution:* (See:  State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205 (1994)).

Conspiracy to Distribute CDS: (In Re Gary T. 222 Md. App. 374 (2015) case abrogated Wallach v. Bd. of Ed., 99 Md. App. 386 (1994)).

Possession with Intent to Distribute: (State v. Woodland, 337 Md. 519 (1995)).

Importation of PCP:* (See: Love v. Curry, 104 Md. App. 684 (1995)).

Marijuana Distribution:* (See: State v. Woodlawn, 337 Md. 519 (1995)).

Theft Related

Theft:* (See: Horne v. State, 321 Md. 547 (1991)).

Embezzlement: (See: Beales v. State, 329 Md. 262 (1993)).

False Statement, Fraud, False Pretenses:* (See: Wicks v. State, 311 Md. 376 (1988)).

Auto Theft: (See: Calloway v. State, 141 Md. App. 114 (2001)).

Unauthorized Use of M/V:* (See: State v. Hutson, 281 Md. 455 (1977) see also: Thomas v. State, 422 Md. 67 (2011)).

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Degree Burglary (Braun v. State, 230 Md. 82 (1962)).

4th Degree Burglary (under CR 6-205 (c)): (See: Bane v. State, 73 Md. App. 135 (1987); see further: Notarianni, Paul J. Is Fourth Degree Burglary Impeachable? The Western Maryland Advocate 4/27/2017 (


Armed Robbery: (See: Summers v. State, 152 Md. App. 362 (2003)).

Robbery:** (See: Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188 (2001), and Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 (2011)).

First Degree Arson: (See: Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 (2011)).

Murder:** (See: Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2 (1962); and Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 (2011)).

Manslaughter:* (See: Hairston v. State, 68 Md. App. 230 (1986)).

First Degree Escape: (See: Gorman v. State, 67 Md. App. 398 1986)).

1st Degree and 2nd Degree Rape:** (Green v. State, 161 Md. 75 (1931), and Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 (2011)).

Treason:** (See: Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md 379 (1905); Fulp v. State, 130 Md. App. 157 (2000); Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348 (1988)).

Perjury:** (See: Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md 379 (1905); Fulp v. State, 130 Md. App. 157 (2000); Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348 (1988)).

Obstruction of Justice:** (See: Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md 379 (1905); Fulp v. State, 130 Md. App. 157 (2000); Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348 (1988)).

Mayhem:** (See: Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 (2011)).

Sodomy:** (See: Kirby v. State, 48 Md. 2 (1962), and Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300 (2011)).

Not Impeachable


Possession of PCP:* (See: Morales v. State, 325 Md. 330 (1992)).

Possession of Heroin:* (See: Cason v. State, 66 Md. App. 757 (1986)).

Possession of Barbiturates: (See: Lowery v. State, 292 Md. 2, 437 (1981)).

Theft Related

Breaking & Entering (4th Degree Burglary, other than CR 6-205(c)):* (See: Bane v. State, 73 Md. App. 135 (1987); see further: Notarianni, Paul J. Is Fourth Degree Burglary Impeachable? The Western Maryland Advocate 4/27/2017 (

Sexually Related Crimes

Attempted Rape:* (See: Watson v. State, 311 Md. 370 (1988)).

Indecent Exposure:* (See: Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701 (1981)).

Third Degree Sex Offense: (See: State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455 (2008)).

Failing to Register as a Sex Offender (ruling implied to include being on the registration at all): (See: Correll v. State, 215 Md. App. 483 (2013)).

Prostitution & Solicitation:* (See: Prout v. State, 311 Md. 328 (1988); see also: Matthews v. State, 68 Md. App. 282 (1986)).


DWI/DUI:* (See: Brown v. State, 76 Md. App. 630 (1988)).

Exceeding the speed limit and driving without a license in one’s possession: (See: Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63 (1927)).

Traffic violations including reckless driving, passing on a curve,  failing to stop at a stop sign, and driving without a license or after license is revoked: (See: Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 196 Md. 36, 75 (1950)).


A court martial conviction for disobeying a superior officer while in the military: (See: Woodell v. State, 2 Md. App. 433, 439 n. 2 (1967)).

Assault with Intent to Murder: (See: Fulp v. State, 130 Md. App. 157 (2000) however see, Id. at Note 4, “[it is] not at all clear that a conviction of assault with intent to rape is relevant to credibility.)

Assault & Battery:* (See: State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 253 (1986)).

Assault on a Police Officer: (See: Thurman v. State, 211 Md. App. 455 (2013)).

Fleeing from Police Officer: (See: Thurman v. State, 211 Md. App. 455 (2013)).

Malicious Destruction:* (See: Pascall v. State, 71 Md. App. 234 (1987)).

Disorderly Conduct:* (See: Morales v. State, 325 Md. 330 (1992)).

Resisting Arrest: (See: Banks v. State, 213 Md. App. 195 (2013)).

Attempted Second Degree Murder: (See: Jones v. State, 217Md. App. 676 (2014)).

Practitioner Note 1: The Maryland Court of Appeals suggested the following factors to determine the probative value test of a conviction that is generally impeachable.  “Numerous courts around the country have established guidelines to be considered in weighing the probative value of a past conviction against the prejudicial effect. See, United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, These factors are (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point in time of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the defendant’s credibility. Mahone, 537 F.2d at 929. While these factors should not be considered mechanically or exclusively, we believe they may be a useful aid to trial courts in performing the balancing exercise mandated by [Maryland Rule 5-609].” (Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 717 (1995)).

Practitioner Note 2:  To be admissible under Maryland Rule 5-609(a)(1), a conviction must be for either an “infamous crime” or a “crime relevant to” credibility. (Fulp v. State, 130 Md. App. 157, 164 (2000)). “Infamous crime” means either treason, common-law felonies, or offenses classified as crimen falsi. (Id.)  “Common law felonies mean crimes that were felonies prior to 1864.” (Id. at Note 3.) “Crimen falsi offenses ‘include crimes in the nature of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense involving some element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness’s propensity to testify truthfully.'” (Id. quoting State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 213 (1994)). “To determine the nature of the crime that led to the prior conviction, the trial court should focus on the elements needed to prove the offenses for which the witness was convicted and not upon the particular facts surrounding that conviction.” (Id.)

Practitioner Note 3: In Beales v. State, the Maryland Court of  Appeals held that it was not harmless error for a trial judge to fail to conduct an adequate balancing prior to allowing impeachment of witness by prior conviction. (329 Md. 263 (1993)).

“Turning to the facts in this case, we think that the trial court did not adequately conduct a balancing of …[a]… 14–year–old theft conviction in terms of the light it might shed on his truthfulness against its potentially unfair prejudice to …[the] defense. In so deciding, we are conscious of the strong presumption that judges properly perform their duties. [citation omitted]. We also recognize that trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic, and that the trial court did refer to ‘the new rule’ and ‘the prior rule.’ Nevertheless, when viewed as a whole, the trial court’s elliptical remarks do not sufficiently demonstrate that it assessed the relative weights of probative value and prejudicial danger. First, the trial court focused largely on the proper form of the impeaching question, rather than on its possible impact. Second, the trial court insisted that the State had a “right” to inform the jury of Lambert’s conviction, a word that suggests obligatory admissibility of the evidence, rather than discretionary admissibility based on the balancing test. Third, the trial court admitted the evidence knowing only that Lambert had been convicted of theft, but not knowing when he had been convicted; Lambert testified that his conviction was fourteen years old only at the very end of the exchange, after the trial court had ruled. The remoteness of a prior conviction is a critical factor to be weighed in the balance. Here it was not.” (Id. at 273-274).
Posted in - Criminal Law, - Evidence, ---- Paul Notarianni | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Motion to Dismiss Due to Speedy Trial


Motion to Dismiss Due to Speedy Trial

Below is a redacted argument section from a motion to dismiss due to Speedy Trial.  It was drafted in 2014 by Paul J. Notarianni.


The charging document in this matter ought to be dismissed for violation of the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  The 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the Maryland Declaration of Rights, firmly establish a Defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  The Maryland Court of Appeals, citing the Supreme Court of the United States, has held that when a pre-trial delay is of “sufficient length, it becomes presumptively prejudicial, thereby triggering a balancing test which necessarily compels the courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” (Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379 at 389 (1999) citing Brady v. State, 288 Md. 61, 65, 415 A.2d 1126, 1128 (1980); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 at 530 (1972)).

The Maryland Court of Appeals, citing the Supreme Court of the United States, has held that there are four factors to be considered for speedy trial analysis.  (Divver 356 Md. at 389). A court is to consider “length of delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Id. citing Baker 407 U.S. at 530).

As for the first factor, length of delay, the length is measured from the date of arrest, filing of indictment, information, or other formal charges, until the date of trial. (Diver 356 Md at 389, citing State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 569 (1984)).  The Maryland Court of appeals has held that, for a District Court Case, “a delay of one year and sixteen days raises a presumption of prejudice and triggers the balancing test.”(Id.).  In Divver, the Maryland Court of Appeals, took into consideration the lack of legal and factual complexity of the case, as well as the limited number of witnesses. (Id. at 391). The Court found the delay was of a “uniquely inordinate length for a relatively run-of-the-mill District Court case.”

As for the second factor, reason for delay, multiple factors are to be taken into account.  The Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted the United States Supreme Court’s position on balancing cause for delay.  “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.  A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.  Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”  (State v. Bailey, 319 Ms. 392, 412 (1990) citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)).  In Divver, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that assigning cases for trial is the obligation of the State.  (Divver at 391). The cause of a court to fail to timely assign a case for trial is immaterial. (Id.).  “If the failure to assign the case was due to congestion or under-staffing of State offices, the delay is chargeable to the State.”  (Id.)

As to the third factor, assertion of the right, a defendant has an obligation to assert his right to a speedy trial.  (Id. at 393).  A burden is placed on the State if “the trial date set by the assignment office is unsatisfactory in relation to the constitutional mandates, the State’s Attorney’s Office should request an earlier date, and, if necessary, ask the court to order compliance.”  (Smith v. State, 276 Md. at 531).

As to the fourth factor, showing of actual prejudice, actual prejudice to the Defendant is to be considered. (Divver at 392).  However, actual prejudice is only a factor, and its  absence, in and of itself,  does not weigh so heavily as to overshadow the first three factors. Id. Actual prejudice may be demonstrated by oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern; and impairment of defense. (Id.)   The Court of Appeals has held that these factors “should only prevail if the only countervailing considerations offered by the State are those connected with crowded dockets and prosecutorial caseloads.  A defendant desiring a speedy trial, therefore, should have it within some reasonable time; and only special circumstances presenting a more pressing public need with respect to the case itself should suffice to justify delay.”  (Id. quoting Baker 407 U.S. at 537.) A lack of actual prejudice favors the State, but not overwhelmingly.  (Id.).

The Maryland Court of Appeals has overturned Special Court of Appeals in matters where no actual prejudice to a defendant was found.  In Brady v. Maryland, the Special Court of Appeals found that a defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated principally because he did not demonstrate actual prejudice in that his defense was not damaged by the delay and he had been released on bail.  Brady v. Maryland, 46 Md. App. 518 (1980).  The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the court “equated or confused actual prejudice . . . with presumed prejudice.  Its conclusion was that Brady had not been able to show any prejudice, actual or presumed, and that, therefore, he was not entitled to dismissal.  There was no mention of whatever offsetting weight the State’s neglect played.”  (Brady 291 at 256-66.)

In interpreting the four factors, none of them are either a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a denial of speedy trial rights.  (Divver at 394 citing Epps v. Maryland, 276 Md at 107; quoting Baker 407 U.S. at 533.)  In Divver, the Court of Appeals found that three of the four factors, particularly the length of time, fell in favor of the defendant.  With the only factor in the State’s favor was a showing of actual prejudice. (Id.).  The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated and the appropriate remedy was dismissal.  (Id.).

Posted in - Criminal Law, - Notes and Forms, - Pretrial, ---- Paul Notarianni | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Victim Impact Statement. Ball v. State


Brief Brief.  Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156 (1997)

Issue:  Victim impact statements and their limits.


 “The impact of a crime on a victim or the victim’s family is both relevant and probative. (citing Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660 at 687). The relevance and probative value of the impact of the offense on individuals beyond the victim’s family, however, is less certain. Victim impact testimony generally should be limited, therefore, to the impact of the crime on the victim or the victim’s family members.”(Id. at 198)

“The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights confer upon a defendant in a criminal proceeding the right to confront the witnesses against him. (citing Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578 at 587.)  Ordinarily, the right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses concerning matters that might expose any bias, interest, or motive to falsify. [citation omitted]. This right ‘extends to the sentencing phase of a capital trial and applies to [live,] victim impact witnesses as well as factual witnesses.’” (Id. at 199, quoting: Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175 at 206.)

“In Payne [v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)]…, the Supreme Court described the role of victim impact evidence as follows:

‘We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. ‘[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.’ [internal citation omitted].’”

“This passage from Payne suggests that victim impact evidence may be used both to assess the harm caused by the defendant’s actions . . . and to counteract mitigating evidence…” (Id. at 205-206).


Practitioner Note:  Relevant statutes include Maryland Criminal Procedure Sections 11-401 and 11-403.   “In the sentencing or disposition hearing the court, if practicable, shall allow the victim or the victim’s representative to address the court under oath before the imposition of sentence… [and the defendant] may cross-examine the victim or victim’s representative.”  (Criminal Procedure Section 11-403 (b) and (c)(1)).  “’Victim’s representative’ means a member of the victim’s immediate family; or another family member, the personal representative, or guardian of the victim if the victim is: deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or otherwise unable to provide the required information.”  (Criminal Procedure Section 11-401).

Posted in - Criminal Law, - HG 8-505 & Sentencing, -- B.B.'s. Brief Briefs

When Traffic Stop = Seizure. Ferris v. State


Brief Brief: Ferris v. State 355 Md. 356 (1999)

Issue:  What constitutes a seizure, under the Fourth Amendment, during a traffic stop.


“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention. (United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, (1980)). The Supreme Court has made clear that a traffic stop involving a motorist is a detention which implicates the Fourth Amendment. (See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, (1984) (analogizing the degree of intrusiveness of the usual traffic stop to the degree of restraint imposed by the typical Terry stop)). It is equally clear, however, that ordinarily such a stop does not initially violate the federal Constitution if the police have probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation. (Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, (1996)). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has also made it clear that the detention of a person ‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ (Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)).” (Id at 369.)

“In sum, the officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention.  (citation omitted). Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. (citation omitted).” (Id. at 372.)

“Although the inquiry is a highly fact-specific one, courts have identified certain factors as probative of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. (See, e.g, United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1275–76 (7 th Cir.1993); United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4 th Cir.1989)). These factors include: the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person’s documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave.” (Id. at 377.)

Posted in - 4th Amendment, - Traffic Offenses, -- B.B.'s. Brief Briefs